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We show that the introduction of Tobin taxes in agent-based models of currency markets can
lead to a reduction of speculative trading and reduce the magnitude of exchange rate fluctuations
at intermediate tax rates. In this regime revenues for the market maker obtained from speculators
are maximal. We here focus on Minority Game models of markets, which are accessible by exact
techniques from statistical mechanics. Results are supported by computer simulations. Our findings
suggest that at finite systems sizes the effect is most pronounced in a critical region around the phase
transition of the infinite system, but much weaker if the market is operating far from criticality and
does not exhibit anomalous fluctuations.
PACS numbers: PACS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972 James Tobin proposed to “throw some sand in
the wheels of our excessively efficient international money
markets” [2] by imposing a tax of 0.05 to 0.5% on all in-
ternational currency transactions. The Bretton Woods
agreement – a system of fixed foreign exchange rates tied
to the price of gold – at that time was gradually being
dismantled, with the USA stepping out in 1971. This
system had been introduced in the wake of World War
II in order to rebuild global capitalism. Tobin feared the
effects of countries exposed to freely fluctuating exchange
rates and suggested, as a second best solution, the intro-
duction of what is now called a ‘Tobin tax’ in order to
suppress speculative behaviour and thus containing ex-
change rates volatility within tenable levels.
Since then, under floating exchange rates, the trad-
ing volume on international currency markets has grown
sharply, especially after the introduction of electronic
trading, reaching a level of 1.5 trillion US-Dollar per day
in 2000 [4]. Most of these transactions are effected on
time-scales of less than seven days, more than 40% in-
volve round-trips within two days or less, and 90% are
of a speculative nature, only one tenth are carried out
within the production sector [4].
While the Tobin tax has never been implemented in
reality the discussion of this issue is still lively and opin-
ions are widely divided between proponents who claim
that a Tobin tax would improve the situation of countries
damaged by international currency speculation [3], and
opponents who reject the proposal on various grounds.
They claim that its implementation would hardly be fea-
sible and extremely expensive, that it would mostly dam-
age developing countries and that through a reduction of
market liquidity, Tobin taxes might indeed result in more,
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not less volatility [5].
The question of whether a tax on financial transactions
reduces volatility or not is indeed a subtle one. On the
one hand excess volatility is related to trading volume,
hence reducing the currency trading activity through the
introduction of a tax on currency transactions can be ex-
pected to reduce volatility. On the other hand specula-
tors provide liquidity and eliminate market inefficiencies,
hence volatility might increase when a tax is levied and
speculators drop out of the market due to the increasing
trading costs. The latter consideration is particularly rel-
evant given that the margin on which speculators live is
extremely small and even a 0.5% tax could turn their
marginal gains negative.
In order to make these considerations quantitative
some authors have investigated the effects of Tobin taxes
in agent-based models of financial markets [4, 6, 7].
These model are capable to reproduce typical features
of price fluctuations in real markets – so-called stylized
facts [8] – and are therefore well suited to shed light on
the effects of introducing a Tobin tax. In the context of
zero-intelligence percolation models [9], Ehrenstein and
co-workers found that generally the introduction of Tobin
tax brings about a reduction in volatility, as long as the
tax rate is not too high to cause liquidity problems [4, 6].
Westerhoff [7] comes to similar conclusions building on
the Chiarella-Hommes approach of modeling financial
markets with systems of heterogeneous agents [10]. At
variance with previous models, this study introduces con-
siderations of agents’ rationality through heuristic expec-
tation models of future returns of a chartist or fundamen-
talist nature.
The present paper addresses similar general questions.
In contrast with previous works, however, we take the
view of a financial market as an ecology of different
types of agents interacting along an ‘information food
chain’. In our picture speculators ‘predate’ on market
inefficiencies (arbitrage opportunities) created by other
investors (the so-called producers). This approach has
been recently formalized in the Minority Game (MG)
[11, 12, 13]. The MG captures the interplay between
2volatility and market efficiency in a vivid though admit-
tedly simplified and stylized way. Indeed the analysis
of the MG has revealed that within this model frame-
work excess volatility and market efficiencies are iden-
tified as two sides of the same coin, both resulting as
consequences of speculative trading. The MG exhibits
two different regimes, one in which the market is fully ef-
ficient and another in which arbitrage opportunities are
not entirely eliminated by the dynamics of the agents.
These regimes are separated sharply in the parameter
space of the model, and it turns out that the boundary
at which the market becomes efficient coincides precisely
with the locus of a phase transition in the language of
statistical physics. At the same time critical fluctuations
– very similar to the stylized facts observed in real mar-
ket data – emerge in the vicinity of this transition but
not further away [14]. Hence, at odds with previous mod-
els, the MG might offer a perspective of understanding
how the introduction of transactions taxes affects the in-
formation ecology and market efficiency. It will here be
important to distinguish between regimes close to and
far away from the above transition between efficient and
inefficient phases of the market. A further advantage of
the MG over other more elaborate agent-based models
lies in its analytic tractability. Despite its stylized setup
the phenomenology of the MG is remarkably rich, but
at at the same time the MG model can be understood
fully analytically with tools of statistical physics of disor-
dered systems [11, 12]. This analytical solution provides
an understanding of the model, which goes much deeper
than approaches to other models purely based on nu-
merical simulations. In particular it is possible to derive
closed analytical expressions for key observables such as
the market volatility, the trading activity of the agents
and the revenue for the market maker.
In brief, our main result is that within the picture of
the MG model a small tax decreases volatility whenever
a finite market exhibits anomalous fluctuations. Indeed
the fundamental effect of the tax is to draw the market
away from its critical point. At the same time, the tax in-
troduces an information inefficiency and thus too high a
tax might not be advisable. The total revenue from the
tax exhibits a maximum for intermediate rates similar
to what was found in earlier works on different models
[4]. Furthermore, the effects of imposing a tax mate-
rialize in the market behaviour only after times which
scale inversely with the tax rate. Extremely small tax
rates may thus need a long time to stabilize turbulent
markets. This can be quite relevant if this time scale
becomes comparable to that over which market’s com-
position changes. In particular, if speculators leave and
enter the population of traders at a too fast rate a small
Tobin tax may fail to stabilize the market. Large taxes in
such a scenario reduce the time the population needs to
co-ordinate below the rate with which new agents enter
the market. Under such circumstances a transaction tax
may thus prevent high volatility states and reduce the
volatility significantly even in an infinite system.
In the following we shall first introduce the grand-
canonical MG (GCMG) and re-iterate its known main
features. In the main sections we then comment on how
a tax on transactions can be introduced and discuss the
effects on the market within the present model. We then
turn to a brief discussion on how to relate these results to
real markets, summarize our results and give some final
concluding remarks.
II. THE GRAND-CANONICAL MINORITY
GAME
A. The model
The so-called grand-canonical MG (GCMG) describes
a simple market of N agents i = 1, . . . , N who at each
round of the game make a binary trading decision (to
buy or to sell) or who each may decide to refrain from
trading. They thus each submit bids bi(t) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
in every trading period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . resulting in a total
excess demand of A(t) =
∑N
i=1 bi(t).
These trading decisions are taken to be based on a
stream of information available to the agents. This com-
mon information on the state of the market (or on other
questions relevant to the market) is encoded in an integer
variable µ(t) at time t taking values in {1, 2, . . . , P} [15].
Here we assume that µ(t) models an exogenous news ar-
rival process, and that the {µ(t)} are drawn at random
from the set {1, . . . , P}, independently and with equal
probabilities at each time [16]. The objective of each
agent is to be in the minority at each time-step, i.e. to
place a bid bi(t) which has the opposite sign of the total
bid A(t). This minority setup corresponds to contrarian
behaviour and can be derived from a market mechanism
taking into account the expectations of the traders on the
future behaviour of the market [17]. In order to do so,
each agent has a ‘trading strategy’ at his disposal. Trader
i’s strategy is labelled by ai = (a
µ
i )µ=1,...,P ∈ {−1, 1}P
and provides a map from all values of the information µ
onto the binary set {−1, 1} of actions (buy/sell). Upon
receiving information µ the trading strategy of agent i
thus prescribes to take the trading action aµi ∈ {−1, 1}.
These strategies are assigned at random and with no cor-
relations at the beginning of the game, and then remain
fixed [18]. Agents in the GCMG are adaptive and may
decide not to trade if they do not consider their strat-
egy adequate. More precisely, each agent keeps a score
ui(t) measuring the performance of his strategy vector.
He then trades at a given time-step t only if his strategy
has a positive score ui(t) > 0 at that time. Therefore,
the bids of agents take the form bi(t) = ni(t)a
µ(t)
i with
ni(t) = 1 if ui(t) > 0 and ni(t) = 0 otherwise. Accord-
ingly the excess demand is given by
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
ni(t)a
µ(t)
i . (1)
3Agent i keeps a record of the past performance of his
strategy aµi by updating the score ui(t) as follows
ui(t+ 1) = ui(t)− aµ(t)i A(t) − εi. (2)
at each step, with constant εi. The first term −aµ(t)i A(t)
is the Minority Game payoff, it is positive whenever the
trading action a
µ(t)
i proposed by i’s strategy vector and
the aggregate bid A(t) are of opposite signs, and nega-
tive whenever i joins the majority decision. The idea of
Eq. (2) is that whenever the payoff −aµ(t)i A(t) is larger
than εi the score of player i’s strategy is increased, other-
wise it is decreased. The constant εi in (2) thus captures
the inclination of agent i to trade in the market. This
inclination will in general be heterogeneous across the
population of agents, with agents with high values of εi
being more cautions to trade than agents with low εi.
In our simplified model we only consider two types of
agents. First we assume that there are Ns ≤ N spec-
ulators who trade only if their perceived market profit
obtained by using their strategy exceeds a given thresh-
old, and hence we set εi = ǫ ≥ 0 for such agents. Here ǫ
can be considered as the speculative margin of gain in a
single transaction.
The remaining Np = N−Ns agents – the so-called pro-
ducers or institutional investors – are assumed to trade
no matter what. Mathematically this is implemented by
setting εi = −∞ for this second group of agents. They
have ni(t) = 1 for all times t. For convenience we will
order the agents such that speculators carry the indices
i = 1, . . . , Ns and producers the labels i = Ns+1, . . . , N .
B. Price process, volatility and predictability
Within the MG setup the market volatility is then
given by
σ2 =
〈
A(t)2
〉
N
, (3)
where 〈. . .〉 will stand for a time-average in the station-
ary state of the model from now on. The normalization
to the number of agents N is here introduced to guaran-
tee a finite value of σ2 in the infinite-system limit, with
which the statistical mechanics analysis of the model is
concerned.
The information variable µ(t) allows one to quantify
information-efficiency of the model market by computing
the predictability
H =
1
PN
P∑
µ=1
〈A|µ〉2 (4)
where 〈. . . |µ〉 denotes an average conditional on the oc-
currence of information pattern µ(t) = µ. A value H 6= 0
ns
ε
n
⋆
s
(np)
FIG. 1: Phase diagram of the GCMG in the (ns, ε)-plane at
fixed np. The red line segment at ε = 0 and ns ≥ n
⋆
s(np)
marks the phase transition in the limit of infinite system size.
At finite size anomalous fluctuations and stylized facts are
found in a region around this critical line, as indicated by the
shaded area. This so-called ‘critical region’ indicates regions
with strong dynamical and finite size effects and is large for
small systems and shrinks towards the critical line segment in
the infinite-size limit.
indicates that for some µ the minority payoff is statis-
tically predictable 〈A(t)|µ〉 6= 0, whereas the market is
unpredictable and fully efficient when H = 0.
The simplest way to relate this picture to a financial
market is to postulate a simple linear impact of A(t) on
the (logarithmic) price (or the exchange rate), i.e to as-
sume that
p(t+ 1) = p(t) +
A(t)
λ
, (5)
where {p(t)} denotes a price (exchange rate) process and
where λ is the liquidity. In a derivation of Eq. (5) from
a market clearing condition λ turns out to be inversely
proportional to the number of active traders
∑
i ni(t)
[17]. In the following we set the liquidity to λ =
√
N ,
so that σ2 becomes the volatility of the price process,
σ2 =
〈
(p(t+ 1)− p(t))2〉. It is found simulations that
the effects of introducing a Tobin tax on the behaviour
of the model are qualitatively similar for either choice of
λ, so that we will stick with the technically more conve-
nient first definition.
C. The behaviour of the GCMG
The GCMG has been studied in great detail in [14, 19]
with methods well established in statistical mechanics.
The analysis is here generally concerned with the sta-
tionary states of the system, i.e. the behaviour which is
reached after running the learning dynamics of the agents
for some sufficiently long transient equilibration time.
The statistical mechanics approach provides exact re-
sults for the model in the limit of infinite market sizes,
where one takes the number of agents N = Ns + Np
and the number P of possible different information states
to infinity, while at the same time keeping the ratios
4ns = Ns/P and np = Np/P fixed and finite. ns and np
along with ε are thus control parameters of the model.
This approach [11, 12, 14] makes it possible to derive ex-
act expressions for several quantities, including the pre-
dictability H and upon neglecting time-dependent corre-
lations accurate approximations for the volatility σ2 can
be found [20, 21]. We will here not enter the detailed
mathematics of the calculations, the resulting equations
for the key quantities in the stationary states as well as
a sketch of their derivation are found in the appendix.
Further details regarding the statistical mechanics anal-
ysis of MGs and GCMGs can be found e.g. in [11, 12, 14]
and in references therein.
The overall picture which emerges is the following [14]:
at fixed np, the statistical behavior of the model is char-
acterized by a critical line at ǫ = 0 which extends from
some critical value n⋆s(np) to larger values ns ≥ n⋆s(np)
than this threshold. This is illustrated in Fig. 1. As
this line (segment) is approached in parameter space the
market becomes more and more efficient, i.e. H → 0 as
ε → 0 for ns ≥ n⋆s. On the critical line (ǫ = 0, ns ≥ n⋆s)
itself the market is fully efficient and one finds H = 0
exactly in the limit of infinite system size. In addition,
numerical simulations of the model at finite sizes close
to the critical line reveal fluctuation properties which are
similar to those observed in real markets [8]. In partic-
ular A(t) has a fat tailed distribution and one observes
volatility clustering. These effects become weaker as the
system size is increased at constant values of ns, np and ε,
and similarly they disappear gradually when one moves
away from the critical line at fixed system size.
The case ǫ = 0 and ns > n
⋆
s(np) is peculiar because
it turns out that the stationary state is here not unique,
but rather that it depends on the initial conditions from
which simulations are started. In the following we will
not consider the case of a strictly vanishing ε, but will
assume instead that speculators have a positive profit
margin ε > 0, even if the latter may be small. All sim-
ulations on which we report are started from zero initial
conditions ui(t = 0) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , Ns.
We finally remark that, a detailed analysis of the tran-
sient dynamics demonstrates that for small ǫ the station-
ary state is reached after a characteristic equilibration
time which scales as 1/ǫ [22]. This long equilibration
time is responsible for some relevant effects if the market
composition changes in time, as discussed in Section IV.
III. TOBIN TAX IN THE GCMG
Within the model setup the introduction of a tax τ
on each transaction can be accounted for by a change
εi → εi + τ for all i = 1, . . . , N . Indeed by raising ε by
an amount τ , an additional cost τ incurs for any given
agent every time they trade and no costs for agents who
refrain from trading. Note that the trading volume of
any fixed (active) agent is one unit in our simple setup
so that τ indeed corresponds to a transaction tax per
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FIG. 2: Volatility, predictability (top) and revenue from spec-
ulators and producers (bottom) for ns = np = 1. Symbols are
data obtained from numerical simulations with PNs = 6000,
every data point is an average over at least 1000 samples, sim-
ulations are run for 1000P steps, with measurements taken in
the second half of this interval. Lines are the corresponding
predictions for infinite systems obtained from the analytical
theory.
unit traded. Hence we will assume
εi =
{
ǫ+ τ i ≤ Ns
−∞ i > Ns (6)
in the following. While this will discourage speculators
from trading (via the reduction of their strategy score)
such a tax will have no effect on the participation of
producers. They will trade at every time step as before
(ni(t) = 1 ∀i > Ns at all times t).
The total revenue from this tax τ is then given by
R =
τ
N
∑
i
〈ni(t)〉 = τ
N
Ns∑
i=1
〈ni(t)〉+τ np
ns + np
≡ Rs+Rp,
(7)
where the first term corresponds to the revenue Rs from
speculators and the second (Rp) to that obtained from
the producers.
An evaluation of the effects of levying a tax τ on the
GCMG then amounts to studying the behavior of the
model as a function of ǫ at fixed model parameters ns
and np. It turns out that here one has to distinguish
between two different regimes, namely close and far away
from the phase transition.
Fig. 2 reports the effects of introducing a tax on mar-
kets whose parameters are far from the critical line. We
here consider np = 1 and ns = 1 < n
⋆
s(np = 1) ≈ 4.15 . . .
so that one operates sufficiently far to the left of the crit-
ical region depicted in Fig. 1. For such parameter values
the results of numerical simulations follow the curves pre-
dicted by the analytical theory perfectly, and no anoma-
lous fluctuations are present in the corresponding price
time-series. The tax has very mild effect both on volatil-
ity and on the information efficiency, as long as ǫ+τ ≪ 1.
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FIG. 3: Effect of introducing a tax on the exchange rate fluc-
tuations A(t). Each panel corresponds to a single run with
parameters ns = 20, np = 1, PNs = 16000, ε = 0.1. In the
initial period up to t = 30P/ε no tax is imposed (τ = 0). At
tε/P = 30 a tax rate (τ > 0 is introduced and then kept fixed
for the rest of the simulation. The tax rate increases from top
(ε+ τ = 0.2) to bottom (ε+ τ = 1). .
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FIG. 4: Volatility (top), predictability (middle) and revenue
(bottom) from speculators and producers for ns = 60 and
np = 1. Markers are data obtained from numerical simu-
lations of systems with different (effective) size L = PNs
with circles, squares and diamonds corresponding to L =
3000, 6000, 12000 respectively. Every data point represents
an average over at least 1000 different strategy assignments.
Simulations are run for 400P +20Ns/(ε+τ ) steps, with mea-
surements taken in the second half of this interval. Lines are
the predictions of the analytical theory for the infinite system.
Fig. 2 also shows that the contribution of speculators to
the tax revenue has a peak at intermediate tax rates, but
that at the same time the revenue Rs obtained from spec-
ulators is smaller than that from institutional investors.
Fig. 3 on the other hand illustrates the response of the
market at the other extreme where ns ≫ n⋆s(np). For
such values of the parameters one is within the critical
region (for small enough ε + τ), and the model exhibits
strong anomalous price fluctuations for market sizes of
a few thousand agents. The deviations from the analyt-
ical theory (which is valid only in the limit of infinite
systems) mark strong finite-size effects in the critical re-
gion. As illustrated in the lower panel of Fig. 3 imposing
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FIG. 5: Volatility as a function of ns at fixed np = 1 for dif-
ferent tax rates (ǫ+ τ = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.5). Markers represent
data obtained from numerical simulations with PNs = 3000,
run for 200P +200P/(ε+ τ ) steps (with measurements in the
second half of this interval). An average over 3000 samples is
taken. Lines are the corresponding predictions obtained from
the analytical theory.
a sufficiently large tax may in such markets have a pro-
nounced effect on the volatility, whereas smaller trans-
action fees may influence the time-series of the market
only marginally. Fig. 4 presents a systematic account
of these effects and shows the dependence of the volatil-
ity, the predictability and the revenue from the tax on
the system size and the tax rate τ at ns ≫ n⋆s(np). In
particular, a significant reduction of the market volatility
can be obtained, while still keeping the market relatively
information efficient. Furthermore, the contribution to
the tax revenue of speculators largely outweighs that of
producers and it is peaked at a value close to that where
the volatility is minimal. The effect of a tax, as shown
in Fig. 4, also depends on the size of the market. The
volatility at low ε + τ indeed decreases with the size of
the system and approaches the theoretical line, making
a tax more effective in small than in large markets.
Fig. 5 relates these two extremes and discusses the
dependence of the volatility on ns at intermediate num-
ber of speculators for fixed np = 1. We here fix the
(effective) system size by keeping L = PNs constant.
For small values of ns one is then well outside the criti-
cal region and the numerical results follow the analytical
predictions (solid lines in Fig. 5). As discussed in Ref.
[14] the simulations then deviate systematically from the
theory at large ns when the system has entered the zone
near the phase transition line. More precisely, one finds
a threshold value ns(L) > n
⋆
s so that numerical simula-
tions agree with the theoretical lines for ns < ns(L) but
deviations and anomalous fluctuations are observed for
ns > ns(L). As L is increased ns(L) is found to grow as
well in simulations (not shown here), and in particular
one has limL→∞ ns(L) = ∞ (at ε + τ 6= 0) so that the
critical region vanishes in the limit of infinite systems.
6IV. MARKETS WITH EVOLVING
COMPOSITION OF AGENTS
In the previous sections we have assumed that all
traders stay in the market for an infinite amount of of
time and that their trading strategies remain fixed for-
ever. Individual agents have the option to abstain from
trading at intermediate times and to join the market
again at a later stage, but no agent in the setup consid-
ered so far can actually modify his strategy vector {aµi }.
Thus the composition of the population of traders does
not change over time. In real-market situations however
it would appear more sensible to expect some fluctua-
tion in the population of traders and to assume that the
market composition will evolve and/or that strategies get
replaced after some time. In the latter case, one would
expect poorly performing strategies to be removed from
the market and replaced by new ones.
In this section we consider the simplest case of an
evolving composition of the market, namely a situation
in which agents (or equivalently their strategies) are re-
placed randomly, irrespective of their performance. More
precisely, at each time step each speculator is removed
with a probability 1/(θNsP ) and replaced by a new one
with randomly drawn strategy and zero initial score.
Here θ is a constant, independent of the system size.
This choice θ = O(L0) guarantees that the expected sur-
vival time of any individual agent scales as NsP so that
one exit/entry event occurs in the entire population on
average over a period of θP transaction time steps. Re-
laxation times in Minority Games are known to be of the
order of P so that the above scaling of θ results in the
composition of the market changing slowly on times com-
parable with those on which the system relaxes. Indeed,
extensive numerical simulations show that the behaviour
of the volatility on θ as well as that of other quantities
characterizing the collective behaviour of the system is
independent of the system size (see Fig. 6). This is in
sharp contrast with the strong finite size effects observed
for ns ≫ n⋆s at a fixed composition of the population of
agents (Fig. 4).
The main feature of the MG market with an evolving
population of agents is a pronounced minimum of the
volatility as a function of ε + τ in the crowded regime
ns > n
⋆
s. In particular the volatility increases as ε + τ
is decreased, even in the limit of large system sizes (in
which a corresponding system with fixed agent popula-
tion would equilibrate to the flat theoretical line as shown
in Fig. 4). This behaviour of the system with changing
agent structure can be related to the fact that relaxation
time of the GCMG scales as 1/(ǫ+ τ) [22]. Thus, when
ǫ + τ is very small, the time it would take a fixed pop-
ulation of agents to equilibrate collectively can be much
larger than the time scale θP over which the market com-
position changes. In this case, the market remains in a
high volatility state indefinitely because the agents do not
have sufficient time to ‘coordinate’ and to adjust their re-
spective behaviour as the strategy pool represented in the
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FIG. 6: Volatility as a function of ǫ+τ in markets with slowly
changing composition. The parameter θ indicates the rate at
which agents are replaced; on average one replacement event
occurs in the entire population every θP time-steps (see main
text for further details). Simulations are at np = 1, ns =
20 and L = PNs = 5000 with an equilibration time T =
400P/(ǫ + τ ) and different values of θ as indicated.
evolving population of agents changes too quickly. Fig.
6 demonstrates that introducing a tax in such markets
with dynamically evolving trader structure can reduce
the volatility considerably.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown how the theoretical picture derived for
GCMG [11, 12, 14] can be used to fully characterize the
impact of a Tobin tax on this toy model of a currency
market. The main results of our study (see Fig. 4) is
that within the GCMG the introduction of a Tobin Tax
reduces the market volatility whenever the market is op-
erating close to the critical line at ǫ = 0, ns > n
⋆
s which
marks perfect efficiency. In this region close to critical-
ity the efficiency scales as H ∼ εα (with a theoretically
predicted exponent of α = 2) and the market is close to
full efficiency H ≈ 0. The model is known to exhibit
stylized facts such as broad non-Gaussian return distri-
butions and volatility clustering for such values of the
model parameters. Thus the reduction of the volatility
by an additional tax is most pronounced when the mar-
ket is operating close to efficiency and exhibits anomalous
fluctuations. Within the GCMG the effect of a trading
tax is due to a significant amount of excess volatility close
to a critical line. The tax τ draws the market away from
criticality in parameter space and thus reduces volatility.
The picture is different when a tax is introduced to a
market which operates far from criticality. For a market
with few speculators (ns < n
⋆
s) the predictability H at-
tains a finite limit when ε+ τ → 0. In this case the tax
has a small effect on volatility.
In both regimes we find that the revenue for the market
7maker from the tax attains a maximal value at interme-
diate tax rates. In the case of a market near criticality
this occurs approximately at a tax rate at which the re-
duction in volatility is largest. In both shown examples
the revenue for the market maker appears to weigh more
on institutional investors than on speculators. Measuring
the revenues from producers and speculators respectively
at other values of ns and np confirms this observation and
we find Rp > Rs (not shown here). Only when the num-
ber of producers is extremely small or when ε < 0 can one
observe instances in which the revenue from speculators
is higher than that from producers. Both an extremely
small number of producers and/or a negative value of the
profit margin ε seem somewhat unrealistic in the present
context so that we do not report further details here.
Thirdly our findings demonstrate that imposing a tax
can also reduce the market volatility in cases where the
composition of the population of traders changes slowly
in time. In this case, the tax allows the agents to reach
coordinated state faster so that the market can reach a
stationary state of relatively low volatility.
Given the stylized nature of the MG, it is hard to make
a connection between the model parameter τ and an ac-
tual tax rate in a real-world market. At any rate it seems
reasonable to assume that a realistic tax rate should be
of the order or smaller than the margin of profit of spec-
ulators, which is gauged by ǫ in the GCMG. The optimal
tax rate τ might be unrealistically large compared to ǫ.
E.g. in Fig. 4 if ǫ = 0.01 volatility can be substantially
reduced only for tax rates τ which are more than ten
times larger.
The GCMG can at best be seen a minimalistic sim-
plified version of a real market. Hence our conclusions
on the behaviour of the MG are at most suggestive with
respect to what might happen in the real world. Still,
the Minority Game is able to capture the interplay be-
tween stochastic fluctuations and information efficiency
in a system of adaptive agents in a simplified way. At
the same time it is analytically solvable with the tools
of statistical mechanics so that quantitative predictions
for example of the volatility can be made based on an
exact theory. In this sense, the analysis of MGs goes
far beyond the results of zero-intelligence models. Most
importantly in the present context our study provides
a coherent theoretical picture of the effects of ‘throwing
some sand in the wheels’ of markets operating close to
information efficiency. The picture developed here can
be extended in a number of directions toward more re-
alistic market modes, but without giving up analytical
tractability. One of the most interesting future direc-
tions might be to endow agents with individual wealth
variables which evolve according to their relative success
when trading in the model market.
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8Appendix
We here sketch the theoretical analysis of the model
with τ = 0 and general values of ε. The introduction of
a tax τ can be accounted for by replacing ε → ε + τ in
all equations below. The starting point of the statistical
mechanics approach is the function
Hε[{φi}] = 1
P
P∑
µ=1
[
N∑
i=1
aµi φi
]2
+
2ε
P
Ns∑
i=1
φi (8)
of the mean activities {φi = 〈ni(t)〉} of the speculators
i = 1, . . . , Ns. The φi, i = 1, . . . , Ns are continuous vari-
ables within the interval [0, 1], recall that producers are
always active and have φi = 1, i = Ns + 1, . . . , N =
Ns + Np. Note that this function depends explicitly on
the strategy assignments {aµi } so that Hε is a stochas-
tic quantity. The strategy vectors which are fixed at the
beginning of the game correspond to what is known as
‘quenched disorder’ in statistical mechanics. It turns out
that the learning dynamics (2) minimizes the function Hε
in terms of the {φi} for any fixed choice of the strategy
vectors. Computing the stationary states of the model
thus reduces to identifying the minima of Hε. It is here
possible to characterize these minima using the so-called
replica method of statistical physics [23]. A different sta-
tistical mechanics approach is based on so-called gener-
ating functionals and deals directly with the update dy-
namics (2), see [12]. Both methods ultimately lead to
the same equations describing the stationary states of
the model, so that we here restrict the discussion to the
former approach.
In the following we give a brief sketch of the so-called
replica analysis of the model, which allows to compute
the minima of the random function Hε. To this end one
first introduces the partition function
Zε(β) =
∫ 1
0
dφ1 · · ·
∫ 1
0
dφNs exp (−βHε[φ1, . . . , φNs ])
(9)
at an ‘annealing temperature’ T = 1/β. In the limit
β → ∞ these integrals are dominated by configurations
{φ1, . . . , φNs} which minimize Hε so that the evaluation
of limβ→∞ Zε(β) allows one to characterize the minima
of Hε.
This procedure is in general not feasible for individual
realizations of the random strategy assignments as the
dependence of Hε on the {aµi } is quite intricate. Instead
we will compute ‘typical’ quantities in the limit of infi-
nite systems, i.e averages over the space of all strategy
assignments.
The key quantity to compute here is the free energy
density
fε(β) = − lim
N→∞
1
βN
lnZε(β). (10)
The limitN →∞ is here taken at fixed ratios ns = Ns/P
and np = Np/P (so that Ns, Np, P are taken to infin-
ity as well). All relevant properties of the typical min-
ima of Hε can be read off from the disorder-average of
limβ→∞ fε(β). Using the identity lnZ = limn→0
Zn−1
n
this problem can be reduced to computing averages of
Znε , corresponding to an n-fold replicated systems with
no interactions between the individual copies. This is
referred to as the replica method in statistical physics
and is a standard tool for the analysis of problems in-
volving quenched disorder [11, 12, 23]. The averaging
procedure leads to an effective interaction between the
replicas, and requires an assumption regarding the sym-
metry of the solution with respect to permutations of the
replicas. In principle this symmetry may be broken, as
different replica copies may end up in different minima of
Hε. In the non-efficient phase of this model,instead, the
so-called ‘replica symmetric’ ansatz is exact, simplifying
the analysis considerably. We will here not report the de-
tailed intermediate steps of the calculation, but will only
quote the final outcome, namely a set of closed equa-
tions for the variables characterizing the minima of Hε
(and hence the stationary states of the GCMG). Further
details of the replica analysis are found in [11, 12, 14]
The minima of Hε turn out to be described by two in-
dependent variables K and ζ, uniquely determined from
the following two relations:
ζ =
1√
ns(Q(ζ,K) + np/ns)
K = ε
[
1− ns
2
(
erf[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2]− erf(Kζ/
√
2)
) ]−1
(11)
with
Q(ζ,K) =
1
2
erfc[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2]
+
1
ζ
√
2π
[
(K − 1)e−(1+K)2ζ2/2 −Ke−K2ζ2/2
]
+
1
2
(
K2 +
1
ζ2
)(
erf[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2− erf(Kζ/
√
2)
)
These equations are easily solved numerically and one
obtains K and ζ as functions of the model parameters
{ns, np, ε}. The disorder-average of quantities such as
the predictability H or the mean activity of the specula-
tors φ = limN→∞N
−1
s
∑Ns
i=1 φi can then be expressed in
terms of K and ζ. One finds:
H = ǫ2
np + nsQ(ζ,K)
(ns + np)K2
φ =
1
2
erfc[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2]
+
1
ζ
√
2π
(
e−K
2ζ2/2 − e−ζ2(1+K)2/2
)
+
K
2
(erf(Kζ/
√
2)− erf[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2]) (12)
. These results are fully exact in the thermodynamic
limit, with no approximations (except for the replica-
9symmetric ansatz) made at any stage. Finally, neglect-
ing certain dynamical correlations between agents the
volatility can be approximated as
σ2 = ε2
np + nsQ(ζ,K)
(ns + np)K2
+ ns
φ−Q(ζ,K)
ns + np
. (13)
As shown in the main text of the paper this approxima-
tion is in excellent agreement with numerical simulations
(up to finite-size and equilibration effects).
